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PARTIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION BY 
AN UPSTREAM MONOPOLIST 
 






  We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist 
to a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of our 
approach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, which 
introduces an interesting trade-off. As a consequence, partial price 
discrimination arises in equilibrium. In particular, we show that inefficient 
downstream firms receive personalized prices whereas efficient firms are 
charged a uniform price. The extreme cases of complete price discrimination 
and uniform price arise in our setting as particular cases, depending on the cost 
of customizing prices. 
 
J.E.L.:  D4, L11, L12 
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 1. Introduction
In this paper, we analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist. Third
degree price discrimination can be deﬁned as the possibility to charge diﬀerent linear prices
to diﬀerent (groups of) customers. In order for price discrimination to be feasible, it must
be possible to separate diﬀerent (groups of) customers, which is called market segmentation.
The seller must also be able to keep resales from occurring. There has been a long debate
on the competitive eﬀects of price discrimination. The Robinson-Patman Act, for example,
makes it unlawful to discriminate in price between diﬀerent purchasers if the eﬀect of the
discrimination may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.
Many papers, have studied the welfare eﬀects of price discrimination. For the case of ﬁnal
good markets we can mention, among others, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian
(1985) and Schwartz (1990). However, as Yoshi d a( 2 0 0 0 )r e c o g n i z e s“ t h ev a s tm a j o r i t yo f
legal and other policy disputes over price discrimination concern input markets, not ﬁnal
good markets”. Then, it seems important the analysis of cases where the discriminating
monopolist is an input supplier and the buyers are downstream ﬁrms producing a ﬁnal
good. In this setting, Katz (1987) and DeGraba (1990) show that price discrimination lowers
welfare, because low cost downstream ﬁrms are charged higher prices. Total output, however,
does not change as a consequence of price discrimination. Yoshida (2000) constructs a model
where total output does change and obtains the counterintuitive result that an increase in
total output is a suﬃcient condition for a welfare decrease.
In a recent paper, Liu and Serfes (2004) introduce a possible limitation to the extent
of price discrimination. They study a setting where ﬁrms can acquire costly consumer
information that allows them to reﬁne market segmentation. It is shown that ﬁrms only
invest when the quality of information is good enough.
In the present paper, we study another possible limitation to price discrimination,
namely, the fact that customizing prices is costly. This introduces an interesting trade-
oﬀ in the analysis: the gains of price discrimination have to be compared with its costs,
which allows us to endogenously determine the extent of price discrimination. Notice that
2our paper is close in spirit to Liu and Serfes (2004) in the sense that, in both papers, price
discrimination involves a costly investment that imposes a trade-oﬀ on the decision to price
discriminate. However, whereas Liu and Serfes (2004) focus on ﬁnal good markets we inves-
tigate intermediate markets. Moreover, the nature of the investment is very diﬀerent in the
two papers. Whereas in Liu and Serfes (2004) it allows to improve market segmentation, in
our paper it allows to customize prices. To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has
been neglected so far by the literature.
We consider an upstream monopolist selling an input to a continuum of downstream ﬁrms
producing an homogeneous good. We assume that downstream ﬁrms are heterogeneous in
their production cost. Transactions between the upstream supplier and downstream ﬁrms can
occur either at a common posted price or at a personalized price. The latter option requires
ac o s t l ys p e c i ﬁc investment in the form of a link that allows the upstream ﬁrm to adjust the
supply contract to the individual characteristics of the ﬁrms1. In other words, the creation
of links allows the upstream ﬁrm to price discriminate among its linked customers. Price
discrimination is proﬁtable because ﬁrms’ diﬀerences in costs translate into diﬀerent elasticity
of input demands. In particular, it is the case that the higher the cost of a downstream ﬁrm
the higher its input demand elasticity. Therefore, the upstream ﬁrm would like to adjust
upwards the wholesale price for low cost ﬁr m sa n dd o w n w a r d sf o rh i g hc o s tﬁrms, knowing
that the personalized contract will only be accepted if it oﬀers a discount with respect to
the posted price.
Regarding the creation of links, we will analyze two possible cases: on the one hand,
the links are created by the upstream ﬁrm in a centralized way; on the other hand, each
downstream ﬁrm decides whether to establish a link with the upstream ﬁrm.
In the ﬁrst case, the upstream ﬁrm prefers to connect high cost ﬁrms, because low cost
ﬁrms would reject the personalized contract whenever the posted price market exists. In the
second case, we have that the gains of creating a link for downstream ﬁrms are increasing
1This cost can represent an investment in a technology that allows for personal communication. It can
also include the direct costs associated with tailoring and enforcing a large number of contracts (Lafontaine
and Oxley (2004)). Or it could also arise as a fee that an intermediary ﬁrm charges to connect buyers and
sellers.
3in their costs, because the higher their costs the higher the discount they will receive in
the personalized contract. This explains that, again, market is segmented such that high
cost ﬁrms create links and are treated personally and low cost ﬁrms attend the posted price
market.
In both cases, in equilibrium, some ﬁrms receive a personalized price while others are
supplied at a common price. This is what we call partial price discrimination. The extreme
cases of complete price discrimination and uniform pricing, studied in the earlier literature,
arise in our setting as particular cases when the cost of the link vanishes and when it is large
enough respectively.
Regarding the eﬀect of (partial) price discrimination on social welfare, things are sim-
pliﬁed because we get the result that total output does not depend on the distribution of
links. Then, (partial) price discrimination only aﬀects total production costs. Given that the
upstream ﬁrm subsidizes ineﬃcient ﬁrms through price discrimination, total cost increases,
which reduces social welfare. Therefore, in our context, we could prescribe not to allow for
price discrimination.
In the last section of the paper, we apply the model to a case where the links are provided
by an intermediary ﬁrm. We can interpret the intermediary as a Business-to-Business (B2B)
ﬁrm that allows for online communications and transactions between buyers and sellers in
exchange for a per-transaction fee. We consider the case of a non-industry participant.2
Observe that e-commerce is a good illustration of our model, given that price discrimination
is a common practice in the Internet. For example, one implication that has already been
noticed in the business press is that the extent of the information obtained in Internet opens
new possibilities for ﬁrms to price discriminate. One very important information that sellers
can obtain come from the past purchase record of their customers (“it [Safeway] uses its
website for (...) collecting and mining data on consumer’s preferences both from the site
and from loyalty cards, so it can personalize promotions” (The Economist, June 24th 1999).
2In practice, the fast growth of the e-commerce has induced also large ﬁrms to organize their own B2B
to manage their relationships with customers and suppliers (Milliou and Petrakis, 2004). For example, in
1999, Ford and General Motors announced that their huge purchasing operations would be transferred to
the web.
4Another advantage of Internet is that as communication is personal, price cuts are only
observed by targeted sellers. The following quotation of the FTC Report on “Competition
Policy in the world of B2B Electronic Marketplaces” clariﬁes the situation “(...) sellers can
customize price lists to reﬂect agreements reached with speciﬁc buyers but ensure that those
prices can be viewed only by the intended buyers”.
In the paper, we consider that a link between the upstream ﬁrm and a particular down-
stream ﬁrm is created only when both of them pay a subscription fee charged by the in-
termediary ﬁrm. We obtain partial price discrimination as the equilibrium outcome of an
extended game where the cost of creating a link is endogenously chosen by an intermediary
ﬁrm. We get, as before, that high cost ﬁrms are the ones treated personally. Moreover, the
burden of the (endogenous) cost of price discrimination mainly falls over the downstream
side of the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present the
general model and solve it for the cases where the upstream ﬁrm and downstream ﬁrms
choose the links respectively. In Section 3, we apply the model to the case where the links
are provided by an intermediary ﬁrm. Finally, the last section discusses the results and opens
new avenues for future research.
2. The Model
We assume that there is an upstream monopolist producing an intermediate good at no cost.
There also exists a continuum of downstream ﬁrms that transform this input on a one-for-one





Downstream ﬁrms are heterogeneous in parameter ci, which is assumed to be uniformly
distributed among them in the interval [0,1]. Market demand is given by P(Q)=A − Q.
The timing of the game is as follows:
In the ﬁrst stage, the links are created. We will consider two diﬀerent possibilities,
5namely, either they are chosen in a centralized way by the upstream ﬁrm or they are decided
individually by downstream ﬁrms. In any case, the cost of creating a link is f.
In the second stage, the upstream ﬁrm decides a uniform wholesale price w to supply
the input to the ﬁrms attending the posted price market and an individual wholesale price
of the form wi = b − aci to be oﬀered to each linked downstream ﬁrm, where a and b are
parameters to be chosen by the upstream ﬁrm.
In the third stage, downstream ﬁrms decide how many units to buy from the upstream
ﬁrm and how many units to sell to ﬁnal consumers. We allow linked ﬁrms to attend the
posted price market and, therefore, they will make use of the personalized contracts only
when w ≥ b − aci.
We look for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game solving it by backward
induction.
Solving explicitly this game is complex. Moreover, as we show below, in order to obtain
the equilibrium distribution of links, which is our main interest, it is enough to solve a
simpliﬁed version of the game (called Game I) where linked ﬁrms do not have the option
to be supplied in the posted price market. Very nicely, we will show that there is a strong
relationship between the equilibria of Game I and the equilibria of our original game.
In the third stage, as we have a continuum of ﬁrms, they behave as price taking ﬁrms.
On the one hand, linked ﬁrm i chooses output qi to maximize its proﬁts:
πi = Pq i − ciqi − q
2
i − wiqi.
This leads to the following individual supply function for linked ﬁrm i:
Si(P)=
P − ci − wi
2
.
On the other hand, the individual supply of a non-linked ﬁrm j is similarly obtained and
amounts to:
Sj(P)=
P − cj − w
2
.











P − ci − wi
2
¶
dci = A − P,
where N = {ci ∈ [0,1]/ ﬁrm i is not linked} and L = {ci ∈ [0,1]/ ﬁrm i is linked}.
This leads to the following equilibrium price:
P
∗(a,b,w)=
2A + l(1 − a)+n + b(1 − z)+wz
3
, (2.1)






We focus on an interior equilibrium in which all downstream ﬁrms produce at this price.
T h i si st h ec a s ei fb, w ≤
2A
3
− 1, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and A>6.
In the second stage, and given the set of linked ﬁrms, the monopolist chooses the per-



















where superscript I denotes Game I.

















Notice that, due to the linearity of the model, the personalized contract does not depend









3Second order conditions are dealt with in Appendix A.
7Observe that the equilibrium price does not depend on the distribution of links either4.














In the ﬁrst stage, we have to derive the equilibrium distribution of links depending on
whether the links are created by the upstream ﬁrm or by downstream ﬁrms. We analyze
each case in turn.
2.1. The upstream ﬁrm chooses the links.
We proceed to characterize the ﬁrst stage equilibrium of Game I. The decisions of the up-
stream ﬁrm are (1) to choose the number of unconnected ﬁrms (that amounts to decide the
mass z of set N) and (2) to decide the distribution of connected and unconnected ﬁrms (that
amounts to the choice of terms n and b l in the proﬁt expression).
In the following lemma, we ﬁnd the distribution of connected ﬁrms that maximizes (2.3),
for a given measure 1 − z of linked ﬁrms. Observe that this amounts to maximize n2 +b lz.
Lemma 2.1. In Game I, for a given measure 1−z of linked ﬁrms, their optimal distribution
for the upstream ﬁrm is any set B =[ 0 ,s] ∪ [z + s,1] for any s ∈ [0,1 − z].
Proof. For the distributions not considered in the lemma, there exist numbers 0 ≤ a<b<
d ≤ 1 and 0 <c<d− b such that ﬁrms in [a,b] ∪ [b + c,d] are not connected and the ones
in [b,b + c] are connected. If z is the measure of unconnected ﬁrms and H is the expected
cost of unnconected ﬁrms other than the ones in [a,b]∪[b+c,d], the payoﬀ of the upstream
4Yoshida (2000) considers a more general transformation technology for the inputs. For the particular
case of one-to-one relationship between input and output, however, the equilibrium price is the same with
and without price discrimination. We prove that this results extends to any possible level of partial price
discrimination.

















We show that these distributions are not optimal because the payoﬀ can be increased






























+( 2 b + c)cz
The second derivative is given by:
f”(b)=2 c
2 +2 cz > 0
T h ec o n v e x i t yo ft h ep a y o ﬀ function implies that these distributions do not maximize
the proﬁts of the upstream ﬁrm. If we allow the upstream to choose parameter b,i tw i l l
choose either b = a or b = d − c increasing its proﬁts. In any case, the set [b,b + c] will
not be any longer an “island” of linked ﬁrms. Iterating this process, we will end up with a
distribution of linked ﬁrms included in set B in the lemma and, given the convexity of the
payoﬀ function, the payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm increases. Now, in order to check that any



























(z + s − s)+
¡
s
2 − (z + s)
2¢
z










2 − (z + s)
2¢
z =0
Therefore, all the distributions in the lemma yield the same payoﬀ.
In order to understand the intuition behind the above result observe that, if all ﬁrms






.G i v e n
that connecting ﬁrms is costly, a subset of ﬁr m sw i l ln o tb el i n k e da n dt h e yw i l lb ec h a r g e d
a price that is an average of their personalized prices. The gain of price discrimination is
higher the higher the diﬀerence between the personalized prices and the posted price, which
is achieved by linking the ﬁrms with more “extreme” cost parameters.
Let us consider again the original game. The following lemma relates the equilibrium
payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm in the second stage of both games.
Lemma 2.2. If w∗(L) ≥ b∗ − a∗ci for all ci ∈ L, then (2.2) and (2.3) are the equilibrium
contracts and payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm in the second stage of the original game. Otherwise,
the equilibrium payoﬀ in the second stage of the original game is strictly lower than (2.3).
Proof. In Game I, let us deﬁne the maximal value of ΠI (L,a,b,w) as ΠI∗(L).
In the original game, let us deﬁne the payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm given the contracts
(a,b,w) as Π(L, a,b,w). Assume this function is maximized in (a0,b 0,w 0).L e t u s d e ﬁne
Z = {ci ∈ L/c i ≥
b0 − w0











The ﬁrst equality is driven by the fact that in both cases we have the same set of linked
ﬁrms and the contracts are also the same. In this case, we will have the same equilibrium
m a r k e tp r i c ea n dt h es a m ep a y o ﬀs.
If Z = L and (a0,b 0,w 0)=( a∗,b ∗,w ∗(L)), the two inequalities transform into equalities.
If Z = L,a n d(a0,b 0,w 0) 6=( a∗,b ∗,w ∗(L)),t h eﬁrst inequality is strict.
10If Z ⊂ L the second inequality is strict and comes from the fact that the equilibrium
payoﬀs in Game I increase by adding links. To prove that, assume that ﬁrms in the inter-
val [a,a + t] are connected, ﬁrms in [a + t,c] are unconnected, H is the expected costs of
unconnected ﬁrms other that the ones in [a + t,c] and z its measure. Following (2.3), the






















where K is a constant
It is immediate to see that f0(t) > 0, which proves the second inequality.
If the upstream ﬁrm connects the downstream ﬁrms in J =[ z,1], it will set in Game I






. But as we have that the highest personalized









), these will also be the
equilibrium contracts in the original game. Therefore, the upstream ﬁrm will obtain the
payoﬀs given in (2.3). We are going to show, with the help of Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, that this
is the optimal distribution of links given that the upstream ﬁrm connects a mass 1 − z of
ﬁrms.
Observe that any set B in Lemma 2.1 (other than J =[ z,1]), has an interval [0,s],w i t h
s>0, that includes the ﬁrm with the lowest cost. For this ﬁrm (and for some neighborhood










; hence, these ﬁrms would refuse the personalized price
and would attend instead the posted price market. Given Lemma 2.2, the upstream ﬁrm
would obtain, with these distribution of links, less proﬁts than in Game I and, therefore, less
proﬁts than if he connects the ﬁrms in [z,1]. With distributions of links diﬀerent than the
ones in Lemma 2.1, the proﬁts of the upstream ﬁrm are bounded above by the proﬁts he
obtained in Game I and, therefore, they are lower than the ones obtained connecting ﬁrms
in [z,1].
Transforming (2.3) taking into account that only ﬁrms in [z,1] are connected, we can
11obtain the payoﬀ of the upstream ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage as a function of z,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
−1
4z3 +( 2 A(A − 1) + 3
4)
24
− (1 − z)f. (2.4)
We are now ready to establish the main result of this section.




Observe that the size of demand (A)d o e sn o ta ﬀect the set of linked ﬁrms. Of course,
it aﬀects upstream gains and losses of connecting downstream ﬁrms, but in the aggregate
these eﬀects cancel out. Notice that creating a link has a direct positive eﬀect of allowing
the upstream ﬁrm to personalize the contract, which is indeed increasing in A.O n t h e
other hand, it has an indirect eﬀect because the upstream ﬁrm will adjust the posted price
upwards. It turns out that this indirect eﬀect is decreasing in A and it exactly cancels out
with the direct eﬀect.
2.2. Downstream ﬁrms choose the links.
First of all, we show that an equilibrium with connected ﬁr m si sd e ﬁned by a cut-oﬀ value
z such that all ﬁrms in [z,1] get connected.
Assume a candidate equilibrium set L of linked ﬁrms. Denote by a+, b+ and w+ the
equilibrium contracts given this distribution of links. Then, it must be the case that a
















This requires that for all ci ∈ L, w+ >b + − a+ci.
In other words, a ﬁrm i is connected in equilibrium only if its personalized price is lower
than the posted price. But then, the maximization program of the upstream ﬁrm is such
that the restriction that linked ﬁrms only use the personalized contract if it oﬀers better
12terms that the posted market is not binding. This implies that the optimal contracts must












































































)(−1 − 4A +1 8 ci) < 0 if A>5.
This implies that if (2.5) is satisﬁed for a ﬁrm with cost parameter ci,i tm u s ta l s oh o l df o r
less eﬃcient ﬁrms. In other words, the equilibrium must have a cutoﬀ structure, where only
high-cost ﬁrms decide to establish a link.
Next, we have to look for the equilibrium value of z.I fﬁrms with ci ∈ [z,1] are connected,






and it is higher than the personalized price












, for all ci ∈ [z,1].
Then, by using Lemma 2.2, we know that the original game has the same equilibrium con-
tracts as Game I.


















z(−2 − 8A +1 5 z)=0 .
13It has only one solution in [0,1],d e n o t e db yz∗. Then, the equilibrium distribution of
links is given in the following proposition.




(4A +1 ) 2 − 2880f
15
.
Observe that when f ≥
8A − 13
192
= fmax,n oﬁrm creates a link in equilibrium.
We have that the number of links created is decreasing in f and increasing in A. Compar-
ing Propositions 2.3 and 2.4, we can conclude that more links are created when downstream
ﬁrms create the links than when the upstream ﬁrm creates the links. In the former case, the
ﬁrms that invest in the link impose a negative externality on the ﬁr m st h a tr e m a i ni nt h e
posted price market, in the form of a higher wholesale price. This leads downstream ﬁrms to
create too many links. In fact, if they could decide the number of links in order to maximize
joint downstream proﬁts, they would create no link at all. In the latter case, the upstream
ﬁrm takes into account the externality when deciding the number of links to be created. As
we have seen, as a result, it creates less links.
Regarding social welfare, it is crucial to notice that total output does not depend on the
distribution of links. Then (partial) price discrimination only aﬀects costs. We know that
the upstream ﬁrm through price discrimination subsidizes ineﬃcient ﬁrms what increases
total costs. Then welfare will be maximized when price discrimination is forbidden. the
third stage equilibrium price does not depend on xS. Therefore, in order to maximize social
welfare it is enough to minimize total costs (production and linking costs). Production costs
will be minimized when marginal costs, wholesale price excluded (ci +2 qi), are the same in
equilibrium for all downstream ﬁrms. This can be the case only when all downstream ﬁrms
receive the same wholesale price i.e. when all ﬁrms attend the posted price market. Then
he would set a prohibitively large tax so that no ﬁrm gets connected.
143. The case of endogenous cost.
Up to now, the cost of a link has been assumed to be exogenous. It seems interesting to
analyze the case where this cost becomes endogenous. One possibility is that there exists an
intermediary in charge of connecting the upstream and downstream ﬁrms. In this case the
cost of the link would be represented by a subscription fee that the intermediary would charge
both to the upstream and any downstream ﬁrm willing to establish a personal relationship.
We assume that the creation of a link between the upstream ﬁrm and downstream ﬁrm i
occurs only when both of them pay the subscription fee.
Let us analyze the following game. First, the intermediary chooses the subscription fee
for the upstream ﬁrm (su) and for downstream ﬁrms (sd). Second, the upstream ﬁrm chooses
for which downstream ﬁrms to pay the subscription fee. Third, each downstream ﬁrm decides
whether or not to pay the subscription fee. In the fourth stage, the upstream ﬁrm sets the
supply contracts. Finally, market competition takes place. We solve the game by backward
induction.
Stages four and ﬁve are like in the previous model. Observe that, for simplicity and in
order to avoid coordination failures, we assume that the upstream ﬁrm pays the subscription
fees before downstream ﬁrms. The solution of these two stages is a direct application of the
results of the previous sections. Assume that the upstream ﬁrm has paid the subscription
fee for downstream ﬁrms in the set [z,1]. This is the relevant case, because we know that the
upstream ﬁrm wants to connect ineﬃcient ﬁrms. In the third stage, in order to determine
which downstream ﬁrms will pay the fee, it is useful to recall what would happen in the
model where links were decided by downstream ﬁrms and f = sd:i n t h i s c a s e ,ﬁrms in
the set [zd(sd),1] would be connected. But now we have the additional restriction that the
upstream ﬁrm has to have paid the subscription fee. Then, the set of downstream ﬁrms that
will pay the fee in equilibrium is given by [Max{zd(sd),z},1].
In order to solve the second stage, we have to recall the result when the upstream chose
the links and f = su. It connected the ﬁrms in the set [zu(su),1]. But now, the upstream
ﬁrm has to be sure that the corresponding downstream ﬁrms will pay the fee. Then, in
15equilibrium it will pay the fee for ﬁrms in [Max{zu(su),zd(sd)},1].








It is easy to see that, in equilibrium, it must be the case that su and sd are chosen so
that zu(su)=zd(sd). The reason is the following: imagine that zu(su) <z d(sd). In this
case, the upstream ﬁrm could increase proﬁts by increasing slightly su. Observe that this
would not change the number of links created but it would allow the intermediary to obtain
more revenues from the upstream ﬁrm. Finally, we solve the maximization program of the
intermediary making use of zu(su)=zd(sd), and get the equilibrium subscription fees s∗
u and
s∗
d (the actual values are complex and not very informative an they can be seen in Appendix
B). We check that they are positive and increasing in the size of demand (A). However, s∗
d
is much smaller and more sensitive than s∗
u to changes in A. In particular, Lim
A−>∞s∗




128. The reason of the low upper bound for s∗
u is that the links that the upstream
ﬁrm is willing to create do not depend on A and it creates no link whenever su ≥ 1
32.A s
the intermediary ﬁrm ﬁnds proﬁt a b l et oc r e a t el i n k si tw i l ls e tt h es u b s c r i p t i o nf e ea ta
lower level than this limit. Observe that the proﬁtable side of the market is the downstream
sector where the subscription fee grows without bounds. In fact, even the existence of a small
transaction cost (k) of collecting the fees of the upstream ﬁrm would induce the intermediary
ﬁrm to provide the connection to the upstream ﬁrm for free. A suﬃcient condition for this to
hold is that k ≥ 1
128, which is the upper bound of the revenues obtained from the upstream
ﬁrm in the model.
Summarizing, we obtain partial price discrimination as the equilibrium outcome of an
extended game where the cost of creating links is endogenously created by an intermediary
ﬁr m .W eo b t a i na sb e f o r et h a th i g hc o s tﬁrms are the ones treated personally. Moreover, we
obtain that the burden of the (endogenous) cost of price discrimination mainly falls on the
downstream side of the market.
164. Discussion and conclusion.
The literature on third-degree price discrimination has mainly focused on its eﬀect on social
welfare. Proﬁtability of price discrimination was taken for granted given that no cost was
associated to it. Our contribution to the literature is to recognize that customizing prices
may be costly, which creates an interesting trade-oﬀ. The upstream ﬁrm, before deciding
whether to personalize the price of a customer, has to balance its possible gains with its
cost. As a result, he decides to pay the cost for his most valuable customers and charge a
uniform price to the rest of ﬁrms. We name this situation as partial price discrimination and
encompasses as particular cases those of uniform price and complete price discrimination
that have focused the attention of the literature so far.
We have considered a model with an upstream monopolist selling an input to a contin-
uum of heterogeneous downstream ﬁrms producing an homogeneous good. We show that,
regardless of whether the cost of the links is paid by the upstream ﬁrm or downstream ﬁrms,
ineﬃcient ﬁrms receive personalized prices. Furthermore, when the cost of the link is en-
dogenized through an intermediary, we obtain that most of the intermediation proﬁts are
obtained from the competitive downstream sector. One is left to wonder whether the results
crucially depend on the structure of the upstream and downstream sector. It is straightfor-
ward to show that the same results can be obtained if we assume instead that the upstream
sector is competitive and we have a monopoly downstream. In this case, however, most of
the proﬁts of intermediation are paid by the (competitive) upstream sector. This indicates
that the side of the market that bears the cost of intermediation depends on the horizontal
level of competition and not on whether it is a buyer or a seller in the input market.
For simplicity we have analyzed the case where the upstream ﬁrm perfectly distinguishes
the cost of every single ﬁrm; that is we assume a complete information framework. It would
be interesting to analyze the polar case where the cost is private information of each ﬁrm.
This would limit the ability of the upstream ﬁrm to price discriminate and would change
dramatically the structure of the model. The analysis is carried over in the companion paper
Bru et al. (2005).
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186. Appendix A















for any distribution of links. Then,




4 < 0. (6.1)




































































2 +2 da = −(a − d)
2 < 0
As f(a)=0 ,f (d) ≤ 0 for d ≥ a
Then, in order to sign F for any distribution of links we proceed the following way. If
we disconnect all segments but one, F (for 6.1) is negative. The result above proves that
connecting the other segment has a negative eﬀect on F. Therefore F<0 for all distribution
of links.
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